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1. Entrepreneurial entry and innovation 
 
 The figure of entrepreneur is difficult to stereotype and various strands of economic 
literature have, over the years, emphasised its different aspects (Ricketts, 2006). Wennekers 
and Thurik (1999) highlight three main definitional schools: the (neo-) classical that describes 
the entrepreneur as an agent driving markets towards their equilibria; the Austrian school that 
sees him/her as someone able to combine resources to address inefficiencies and to target 
gaps in the markets; and, the Schumpeterian/German school, which sees the entrepreneur as a 
de-stabilising force – a destructive creator.  
This paper is particularly concerned with the innovation aspect of the entrepreneurial 
entry and this motivates our choice of theoretical framework of reference. Our key research 
question is to investigate to which extent the transformation of innovative entry into high 
growth aspirations is conditioned by two key factors in the institutional environment: 
availability of venture capital and protection of  intellectual property rights. 
However unlike the Schumpeterian tradition, we focus on incremental, low level, 
small scale process of innovating (Ricketts, 2006) based on widely dispersed knowledge as 
represented by a mass of individual entrepreneurs. Accordingly, we draw on the Austrian 
school. Among its founders, Hayek (1948) emphasised the knowledge utilisation role played 
by the entrepreneur. Mises (1966) differentiated entrepreneurs from other individuals is their 
ability to develop, and to act on predictions about the future. Generally, alertness is what 
characterises the entrepreneurial endeavour and it cannot be bought: it is a tacit resource, 
which may be seen as costless - since this type of alertness effectively means following 
‘hunches’ which don’t have clearly defined opportunity costs (Harper, 2003). Within this 
approach the element of novelty is acknowledged since entrepreneurial alertness goes beyond 
the agents’ usual optimisation process, often encountered in neoclassical economic 
modelling, and it implies the identification of the new and also adoption of new objectives – 
as opposed to referring to the allocation of given means to achieve given ends (Harper, 2003). 
Yet for Kizner (1992, 1997) innovation represents only one type of entrepreneurial alertness, 
the others being arbitrage and speculation. 
While his emphasis on discontinuity has been questioned on empirical grounds it is 
still Schumpeter who accentuates the strong linkages between entrepreneurship and 
innovation and sees the two to be indivisible as the former always requires some degree of 
the latter (Schumpeter, 1934; Ricketts, 2006). Similarly, Drucker (1994) highlights 
innovation as the activity specific to entrepreneurship. However, this approach may be 
interpreted in two ways. When seen in a broad sense it attributes innovativeness to any 
entrepreneurial venture. When a narrow sense applies, we see as entrepreneurial only those 
new ventures, where specifically defined element of innovativeness can be recognised. The 
latter definition is more restrictive than the one discussed above as it specifically requires for 
the entrepreneur to be also an innovator in some identifiable sense. 
Accordingly, a focal point of this paper is to highlight distinction between the 
innovative entrepreneurial entry and a non-innovative entry, and to demonstrate that it is the 
former that links with more dynamic outcomes.  
In addition, these two types of entrepreneurship link with finance in a different way, 
as innovative entry is likely to come with a risk premium (since the expected outcome of 
innovating may be more difficult to assess that that of imitating). In this sense while, unlike 
Shumpeter, our interpretation of entrepreneurial endeavour embraces the risk element, it is 
also focused on the Schumpeterian (innovative) role played by entrepreneurs. Accordingly, 
where we depart from the Schumpeterian approach, is in that the latter does not emphasize 
the uncertainty aspect of being an entrepreneur and underplays the role of the entrepreneur as 
a ‘risk-handler’. The intrinsic connection between entrepreneurship and bearing risks was 
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recognised as early as Cantillon and it has been considerably developed by the neo-classical 
school (Parker, 2004). In particular, Knight (1921) differentiates between risk and 
uncertainty. Parallel to this, the risk element attached to the decision of becoming an 
entrepreneur can be broken-down into two separate elements: an objective and a subjective 
one. The amount of risk faced, both objective and subjective, plays a role in determining 
entrepreneurial decisions (Arenius and Minniti, 2005; Parker 2003). However, where, as in 
innovative projects, the proportion of uncertainty (subjective element) to (objective, 
measurable) risk is high it may be difficult to attract external finance and secure resources to 
transform the new projects into high-growth ventures. It is here that some specific forms of 
finance, venture capital in particular, may play critical role; these types of finance may be 
seen either as translating uncertainty into objective risk or more accurately as sharing some 
entrepreneurial roles with the founder of new business based on more tacit elements of 
knowledge corresponding to uncertainty Moreover, venture capital type of finance implies a 
more elaborate form of financial transaction, which protects not only the financier but also 
the entrepreneur against expropriation of his/her tacit knowledge. Under conditions where the 
relation with the financier is no longer arm-length, the latter becomes to some extent a co-
entrepreneur with higher level of involvement in the new venture. The design of venture 
capital relationship solves two problems. The financial contract guarantees better access of 
financier to the tacit knowledge pool of entrepreneur but also protects the interests of the 
latter. The more complex, closer and longer term nature of the relationship requires both 
formal contract and trust based on specific reputation of VC firm to safeguard the 
entrepreneur's knowledge-related assets.  
Yet the issue of protection of gains from new knowledge extends beyond the 
availability of a specific type of financial contract. Once innovative elements of the new 
venture are implemented, protection of new knowledge becomes critical for the entrepreneur. 
This makes the security of intellectual property rights essential: if it is weak, incentives to 
expand new innovative businesses are also weaker. 
  
Our analysis refers to innovative ventures which are new whether they are also 
creating new markets or entering existing ones (Davidsson, 2003). In contrast, some authors 
(see, for instance, Gartner 1988) believe that the creation of new organisations is synonymous 
with entrepreneurship, in which case within the set of new firms, the line distinguishing 
innovative and imitative ventures is blurred.      
Existing businesses face a very different obstacle from new entrants when trying to 
innovate: since while the former will have to break down, at least to some extent, an existing 
structure, the latter may design and implement a structure within which innovation can be 
delivered more easily (Drucker, 1994). More generally, Acs (2006) provides an overview of 
empirical findings and concludes that new firm creation is a key link between knowledge 
creation and its commercialisation, in particular when this knowledge is not yet well shaped. 
This motivates our focus on entrepreneurial entry. 
Yet innovative element in entrepreneurial entry presents additional difficulties. For 
Amason et al. (2006) one of the main differences between “imitators” and “innovators” start-
ups is that the latter will have to be both new and different simultaneously. Again, this clearly 
makes their businesses more risky as management cannot simply emulate competitors but 
have to learn from its own mistakes.  
Seen in the dynamic context of entry, various definitions of entrepreneurship 
discussed are not mutually exclusive and traits of each are likely to coexist within all 
entrepreneurs. In particular, Noooteboom (1993) suggests that the inception stage of an 
enterprise is Schumpeterian in nature, while its execution is more Austrian. This two-phased 
approach is also supported by Shane and Venkataraman (2000) who see entrepreneurship as 
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made up of two processes: discovery and exploitation. Following this approach, the dataset 
used in this paper refers to start-ups, which are in between the two processes and could be 
described as being in a post-discovery but pre-exploitation phase of development.  
It is also in this early stage of development, that one is first able to distinguish 
between the high growth oriented and non-high growth oriented entrepreneurship. It has been 
shown that it is a relatively small number of enterprises which are responsible for the 
majority of job creation. Hence we differentiate between “normal” and High Growth 
Aspiration Entrepreneurship (HGE). 
An additional novel aspect of our work is that the existing research on innovation is 
based on surveys that exclude micro-firms (e.g.: community innovation surveys); in contrast, 
we are able to capture the whole size spectrum of the entrepreneurial entry. 
  
To summarize, this paper combines focus on innovative entry with the cross-country 
heterogeneity in the financial and institutional environment to ask how those interact to shape 
growth aspirations of entrepreneurs. This is where we aim to fill a gap in the literature. In 
particular, it has been highlighted that demonstrating empirically a casual link between 
innovation and venture capital and employment growth is a challenging task (Gompers and 
Lerner, 2001; Jeng and Wells, 1998). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we review the 
relevant literature and design our hypotheses; Section 3 introduces the dataset and empirical 
model; Section 4 reports the results of our analysis, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Innovation, Venture Capital and Growth 
  
In recent times, there has been considerable interest from policy makers regarding the 
role of small, innovative, young firms. This corresponds to the main questions addressed by 
this paper: is there a link between being innovative and having high growth aspirations entry 
(HGE)? And how this relationship is moderated by the nature of financial and institutional 
environment faced by new ventures?  
We start with hypothesizing a positive relationship between HGE and innovation. We 
believe that there are two main mechanisms through which this may take place.  
 Firstly, the proposed link between innovation and growth aspirations is a reflection of 
the general maxim that higher rewards imply riskier ventures. The launch of a new product 
invariably involves an additional element of risk, which is difficult to spread. While imitating 
is simply a numbers’ game (offering an existing good at a lower price), introducing 
something new comes with an increased risk element. This is why established firms only tend 
to dedicate a certain amount of resources to the development of new products. Innovation 
risks are offset by the profits which the firm can internalise from the introduction of those 
products/processes which prove to be profitable. For the investment in R&D to be a 
successful strategy, these profits have to be higher than the returns offered by existing 
products as they will also have to cover for failed attempts. In other words, a fundamental 
difference between the process of innovation in newly created and established enterprises is 
that: in large firms R&D departments are able to experiment and to afford a certain failure 
rate while in innovative start-ups investors may be putting all their eggs in one basket. 
 In our dataset, respondents involved in start-up activities are asked about their 
expectations but, at this stage, we do not know how many will fail: expectations of 
entrepreneurs who believe they will experience high growth are based on their subjective 
assessment of risks associated with their ideas. This ex-ante approach is very different from 
the ex-post analysis usually conducted regarding firms’ growth. Nevertheless, if high growth 
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gazelles are critical for the wider benefits of entrepreneurship to materialise, the first step to 
achieve that is to create conditions where the numbers of high aspiration entrepreneurs are 
higher. That in turn justifies focus on high growth aspiration entrepreneurship. 
Secondly, the link between growth and innovativeness results from the fact that 
innovators may be creating new markets and could enjoy periods of substantial market power 
given lack of competitors (especially if intellectual property protection is strong and entry 
involves new patents being registered). More mature markets, on the other hand, are 
characterised by the presence of established suppliers and may exhibit more modest growth 
rates. One explanation of this may be that start-ups concentrate on innovating in less crowded 
technological fields (Ameida and Kogut, 1997). 
Thirdly, under more developed financial systems, innovative entrepreneurs are likely 
to attract amount of financing necessary for further expansion, in particular in the form of 
venture capital. It is important to emphasise that while supply of venture capital is unlikely to 
affect entrepreneurs directly as early as at the time of their start-up, it creates powerful 
incentives based on subjective expectations. In particular, being aware of venture capital 
availability, the entrepreneurs may choose “just do it strategy” instead of a more gradual 
“wait and see strategy”. That is, they will use their own resources to achieve some 
“intermediate milestone” that would enable them to contact outside investors successfully. In 
contrast, where supply of venture capital is weak, “wait and see” strategy of gradual build-up 
is more likely (Schwienbacher, 2007). 
We consider those three issues in more detail below. 
 
2.1. Innovation and growth aspirations 
 
Given our focus on growth aspirations, the ongoing debate on what the determinants 
of a firm’s growth rate are has also implications for our research. In particular, while Gibrat’s 
Law states that a firm’s size and its growth are independent,  several studies have advocated 
the opposite, and a strong consensus has not still emerged (Mata, 1994). If one assumes that 
there is a strong correlation between age and size, then this debate becomes relevant for our 
research since, given that all entrepreneurs interviewed are “nascent”, one may (or may not) 
expect then to have similar (or different) growth expectations depending on one’s position 
with respect to Gibrat’s Law. Therefore, large dispersion in growth expectations at a starting 
point may itself is taken as evidence against a strong link between the size of the venture and 
its growth. Where our research converges with a criticism of Gibrat’s law is to stress the role 
of innovation as something which, in itself, shifts firms’ size distribution (Ameida and Kogut, 
1997). This is echoed by Cefis and Marsili (2004) who find, for a sample of Dutch firms that, 
even after accounting for age and size, firms seems to benefit from an innovation premium 
which increases their life expectancy. 
  
Finally, the relationship between innovation and growth is ultimately reflected in 
cross-country studies where an economy’s rate of growth can be explained by innovation; the 
latter becomes more important for countries which are closer to the technological frontier 
(Acemoglu et al., 2006), and those are the countries we focus on in our study (high middle 
income and high income economies) . Accordingly, the link between innovation observed at 
a venture level and growth aspirations that we will focus on represents one of the 
microeconomic foundations for the link between innovation and economic growth.  
   
H1: Owners-managers (entrepreneurs) of innovative start-up have higher growth 
expectations than other entrepreneurs.  
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2.2. Supply of venture capital and growth aspirations 
 
A crucial aspect of innovative entry concerns the way the new ventures are financed. 
When an external agent finances any nascent enterprise, a fundamental issues of information 
asymmetry emerges. Yet this is even more pronounced in cases of innovative entry. As put 
by Junkunc (2007): “In the context of breakthrough innovation the asymmetric information 
problem becomes more akin to asymmetric knowledge, since even with full information 
typical individuals will be unable to evaluate the ramifications of the disruptive 
breakthrough.” So our second research question is: how the set of financial opportunities 
available to the innovative entrepreneur affects his/her growth strategy? A basic distinction 
can be drawn between self-finance and externally funded enterprises. The second group is 
usually broken down further into: family, friends, venture capitalists (VCs) and business 
angels. Even this distinction may be too restrictive as it is debatable whether Kirzner’s 
entrepreneurial alertness can be marketed since “to hire ‘an entrepreneur’ is to be an 
entrepreneur” (Harper, 2003): to some extent, venture capitalists become themselves part of 
the entrepreneurial effort. 
Zider (1998) argues that VCs essentially fulfils a funding gap which is created out of 
a particular situation. The typical entrepreneur that may be attractive to a VC is someone who 
has a good idea and skills but a lack of hard assets to offer as collaterals and whose 
performance is difficult to assess (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). The levels of risk associated 
with this type of potential debtor are so high that normal approaches to risk calculations 
would mean charging interest rates above the limits set by usury laws. VCs, equipped with 
specialised expertise, are happy to step in and fill this gap by typically expecting ten folds 
returns over just five years (or a 58% annual interest rate with no early repayment options) 
for successful projects (Cumming, 2006).   
Thus, being innovative and new simultaneously is likely to have financial 
implications for the enterprise. We hypothesise innovative endeavours to be generally more 
expensive for two reasons, since: firstly, they are likely to involve additional sunk costs (for 
instance because of the additional research required) and, secondly, as mentioned, the 
uncertainty associated with the project will attract a higher risk premium making innovative 
investments more expensive than imitative ones. These higher costs are likely to require 
external founding. Hellman and Puri (2000) show that start-ups which are innovating are 
more likely to receive capital from VCs. The authors differentiate between imitators and 
innovators and find that the latter are more likely to receive VC financing.    
The mechanism through which VC involvement can benefit emerging companies goes 
beyond the purely financial contribution made. As widely recognised, VCs also provide 
insight and experience of the specific industry in question to the CEO of the new firm which, 
it has been shown, can in itself add value and promote growth. In particular, VC involvement 
affects firms’ performance through the various stages of development of the project. Firstly, 
because of the pre-investment screening process and, subsequently, through monitoring and 
value adding (Berger and Udell, 1998 and Gompers and Lerner, 1999). For instance, 
Manigart et al. (1996) show that while the level of experience of VCs does not seem to have a 
clear relationship with value added, they show that VCs’ experience of the start up’s industry 
is positively associated with value added. 
Moreover, the employment growth and firms’ financing issues are closely related. 
Belke et al. (2003) use OECD country data for the 1986-1999 period and find that even 
controlling for institutional variables and labour and capital market characteristics, the 
presence of venture capital has a positive impact on employment growth. Yet on the other 
hand, for Belgium, Manigart and Hyfte (1999) finds that although VC results in higher cash 
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flows and total assets it does not seem to be associated with increases in employment growth 
compared to firms operating in the same sector and of similar size. Similarly, using 
questionnaire data from 500 British and German firms, Buergel et al. (2000) find that VC 
financing does not result in higher levels of turnover or employment growth. These 
inconsistencies in empirical results may, at least in part, be a result of the adoption of 
inappropriate estimation techniques. Firm level studies on VC and firms’ performance often 
compare VC backed enterprises against non-VC ones. However, as highlighted by Engel 
(2002) this often results in biased results as a few important firms characteristics may 
determine which firms VCs select. He therefore adapts selection approach to a bivariate 
probit setting and finds that German firms with external non-VC investors achieve 50 per 
cent higher employment growth and that VC involvement results in a striking 170 per cent 
increase in the same growth rate.  
While our approach is akin to this literature, we introduce a novel angle. We focus on 
the link between aggregate VC supply at a macro level and growth aspirations of an 
individual entrepreneur, with adequate controls. The key intuition behind our approach is that 
while in a start-up phase it is unlikely that an innovative entrepreneur may already secure 
VC-type funding, availability of such funding in the economy will encourage the 
entrepreneurs to form high growth aspirations, as they may expect to realise higher profit by 
not being constrained financially in the latter stage of their projects, when it will be 
appropriate to seek VC finance. This is consistent with the formal model presented by 
Schwienbacher (2007): in an environment where VC is available, the new entrepreneurs will 
aim to reach “intermediate milestone” enabling them to contact financiers; accordingly, 
initially they will rely on their own resources to engage in a more rapid expansion, following 
the “just do it” strategy. 
 
H2a: Higher availability of VC will result in HGE.  
H2b: This effect will be stronger for innovative ventures. 
 
2.3 The institutional landscape and high-aspiration entry 
 
New institutional economics (Williamson, 1985; 2000) suggests that institutions 
shape the behaviour of agents. North (1990), similarly, places great importance on the macro-
level environmental characteristics:  
 
“Discovering markets, evaluating markets and techniques, and managing 
employees do not occur in a vacuum […] The kinds of information and 
knowledge required by the entrepreneur are in good part a consequence of 
a particular institutional context.”  
 
The actions of individuals are to be inscribed within the environment. This is why, 
innovation and entrepreneurship have been described as forming part of a country’s, culture. 
For instance, some researchers advocate that entrepreneurship and innovation may be 
determined, at least to some extent, by the level of individualism in a society (Morris, et al. 
1993). This dovetails with the various definition of entrepreneurship described above; for 
instance, Kirzner’s concept of entrepreneurial alertness describes a process taking place 
mainly at the person level, since it is the individual who recognises and exploits specific 
opportunities. Shane (1993) found that individuals-oriented societies innovate more than 
group-oriented concluding that “autonomy, independence and freedom” determine a 
country’s level of innovation. In turn, the realm of culture affects country’s formal 
institutional landscape, which may or may not be conducive to innovation (e.g. tax regimes, 
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public support for private research initiatives). Hessels et al. (2007), for instance, show that 
the level of social security has a negative effect on the supply of HGE (which they refer to as 
ambitious entrepreneurship). 
Empirical evidence on the link between institutions and HGE is provided by Estrin et 
al. (2009). However, the authors do not consider the link between the high growth aspirations 
and innovativeness of the new ventures. The latter is the novel element of our research. 
Consistent with this we intend to focus on the aspect of the institutional environment that 
may be most conducive to a successful expansion of an innovative entry, namely protection 
of the intellectual property rights. The macroeconomic link between growth and intellectual 
property protection has been established by Gould and Gruben (1996), who also noticed that 
innovation is likely to be an intermediating channel. However, our contribution is to explore 
micro-foundations of this relationship. Accordingly, we expect that: 
 
H3a: Intellectual property protection is important for HGE. 
H3b: Its effect on HGE is stronger for innovative entrants. 
 
 
2.4 Control variables at the individual level 
 
In the previous section we have considered both how country-level variables may 
impact HGE and how they may also moderate the impact of (interact with) innovativeness 
observed at individual level of respondent1. As we focus on the start-up phase we exclude the 
intermediate level of firm from the analysis in this paper, as we do not consider the phase 
when firms are actually already operating for some time.  
We now turn to consider control variables that operate at the level of the individual2. 
Interestingly, most economics models on entrepreneurship leave the source of individual 
differences largely unexplained (Harper, 2003). In section 2.1 we already discussed how the 
‘individual’ aspect of the innovative process may affect high growth aspirations. In this 
section we motivate additional control variables that enter our specifications. 
We focus on whether an entrepreneurial entry is associated with high growth 
expectations. The assessment by a decision-maker will fundamentally depend on perceptions. 
Theoretical models on occupational decisions will tend to assume the individual as a rational 
utility maximising agent. However, this understanding of the risks and rewards associated 
with becoming an entrepreneur are, in reality, highly subjective. Arenius and Minniti (2005) 
find that perceptual variables are all significant in explaining the likelihood on 
entrepreneurial entry occurring; even when economic factors have been included in the 
estimation. These results are echoed by Ardagna and Lusardi (2008). 
Individuals differ in their understanding of how actions influence events (locus of 
control) and in a more personal belief how one may, or may not, be able to carry-out the 
necessary actions (Harper, 2003). In particular, those two traits result in alternative attitudes 
towards risk taking. Given the relationship between risk and entrepreneurial endeavours, 
which we discussed in section 1, we expect that more risk-averse individuals will be more 
likely to choose HGE entry. Therefore, we expect our risk proxy, fear of failure, to possess 
some predictive power. We expect entrepreneurs who enter with high growth aspirations to 
                                                 
1  Some individuals are more prone to invent than others. A single person,  Kornelis A. S. Immink, a 
Dutch scientist and entrepreneur, personally advanced the era of digital recording having been involved with the 
development of: the Compact Disc, the Digital Versatile Disk and the Blu-Ray Disc. 
2  Another alternative, advocated by Davidsson (2003) is that ideally the unit of observation should be 
the start-up process itself – and the idea behind it– which may transcend from the concept of the firm or the 
entrepreneur. 
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be more confident and generally less fearful. While another interpretation could be that high 
aspirations entrepreneurship attracts individuals who overestimate the likely pay-offs from 
their ideas (Hall and Woodward, 2008), it is also the case that this type of overconfidence has 
self-fulfilling properties (Aidis et al, 2008).  
 
We expect education and experience to be additional factors explaining HGE. Growth 
potential may be a result of someone having identified a gap within a particular market and 
this is likely to involve being aware, or knowing personally, other entrepreneurs in that 
industry. That in turn is correlated with prior entrepreneurial practice. In particular, owners of 
established business may have advantage with respect to high growth aspirations 
entrepreneurial entry.  
In addition, differences in entrepreneurship rates have been found to vary according to 
age (Levesque and Minniti [in press]; Reynolds et al. 2003; Blanchflower, 2004; Ardagna 
and Lusardi, 2008; Gray, 2002) and to gender (Brush, 1990; Langowitz and Minniti, 2005; 
Estrin and Mickiewicz, 2009). We expect these factors to also play a role in determining high 
growth aspirations entrepreneurial activity. In addition, in our specifications we introduce an 
interactive effect between gender and age. 
We also control for employment status, as a decision on the mode of entry is 
conditional on the labour market states. For high aspirations entry, being in employment may 
be associated with important network and experience effects, in addition to the factors 
discussed above, therefore the expected sign should be positive. 
 
 
2.5 Control variables at the aggregate level 
 
For reasons presented about our primary institutional variable of interest is protection 
of intellectual property. Given that, GDP per capita is a good catch-all control variable that 
proxies both for the level of economic development and for the level of institutional 
development – those two are closely correlated. However, while having more developed 
economy and better functioning institutions may be conducive to the efficient allocation of 
resources between agents, it is also possible that relatively poorer countries may provide 
more opportunities for HGE thanks to catching-up potential as reflected on micro level. The 
latter effect may generate negative correlation between GDP pc and HGE entry. 
 
With respect to availability of finance, our primary focus is on the effects of venture 
capital availability on individual decisions to enter. However, we need to introduce additional 
financial controls, as supply of venture capital may be correlated with the overall availability 
of finance. Obviously, availability of funding in addition to VC may determine entrepreneurs’ 
growth aspirations as well. Obtaining credit from a bank plays a critical role. Aghion (2007) 
introduces financial constraints in a model of entry and predicts that in societies with high 
agency costs, and therefore underdeveloped financial sectors, growth rate will be lower. In 
addition, in relation to start-ups, informal finance forthcoming from family and friends may 
play a critical role substituting or complementing institutionalised sources of finance 
(Korosteleva and Mickiewicz, 2008). We proxy for the latter by using country level 
prevalence rates of informal finance extracted as peer effects from our data (see Table 1 
below for details). One standard variable used for proxy of formal finance is credit to private 
sector over GDP (Beck et al., 2008). However, due to multicollinearity, the variable does not 
fit with our other indicators well. For that reason we rely on the related Wall Street Journal / 
Heritage Foundation index of financial freedom, which proxies for the extent of financial 
options. Also, it is more directly related to entrepreneurial finance, as typically more liberal 
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banking regimes has stronger effect on supply of finance to more risky recipients, and start-
up, especially high aspirations start-ups fall in this category. 
 
Koellinger and Thurik (2009) find, using a panel generated with GEM data, that there 
is no evidence indicating that entrepreneurship follows the business cycle. Moreover their 
study suggests that the opposite may be true: “entrepreneurial activity is a leading indicator of 
the business cycle in a Granger-casualty sense”. We join the current discussion on whether 
entrepreneurship may be pro-cyclical, a-cyclical, or a leading indicator of a cycle, by 
including the growth rate of the economy in our models. However, to be consistent with 
Koellinger and Thurik (2009), and to take into account that entrepreneurship and overall 
economic activity may affect each other with lags, we use the growth rate of the previous 
year as one of our independent variables. We expect HGE to be weakly pro-cyclical. 
 
3 The dataset and variables 
 
This paper uses a purposely constructed dataset which combines country-level variables with 
individual level variables from the available version of the integrated Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor database (GEM) over 1998-2004.   
A thorough description of GEM can be found in Reynolds et al. (2005, 2008). Based 
on adult-surveys conducted in the 1998-2004, GEM covers 41 countries. In all, at least 2000 
interviews were carried-out in each country which goes a long way in tackling the selectivity 
bias typical of other datasets. The database’s defining feature is that allows researches to 
study nascent entrepreneurs (individuals who are in the process of launching a venture) 
across-countries.  
We are further able to differentiate between entrepreneurs offering a product which is 
new to some customers and one which is new to all customers since entrepreneurs are also 
asked how new the technology they are planning to use is. This is aimed at capturing varying 
degrees of technological development across the sample of countries. Interestingly, although 
the answers given are very similar across country groups, the individual statements might 
have been based on very different technologies. For instance, something which is considered 
as “very latest technology” in country A may be considered as obsolete in country B. This 
effect is acknowledged in Bosma et al. (2007) who conclude that differences between the 
levels of innovative early-stage entrepreneurial activity may be a reflection of varying 
degrees of competition and availability of new products across countries.  
Similarly, there are also likely to be vast differences in the innovation rates across 
industrial sectors. In some cases, for instance the production of raw material, it is virtually 
impossible to introduce new products (although process-innovation is still possible). At the 
opposite end of the spectrum, the pharmaceutical industry hinges on continuously investing 
in the developments of new drugs (which can take many years) and producers are able to re-
coup their investments from patenting successful drugs. Still another model is found in high-
tech industry where firms leap-frog by introducing a new technology which is used for a 
number of years until it is surpassed by a technology introduced by a rival. In this sense, an 
entrepreneur wanting to start a new enterprise will have to come to terms with the 
characteristics of the industry he/she is choosing to operate in. Inevitably, some sectors will 
be more innovation prone than others and the new entrepreneur may be constrained by his/her 
previous expertise and by financial resources (as some sectors are more capital intensive than 
others). However, due to heavy cost of missingness we have refrained from attempting to 
construct industry-specific controls and agree with Davidsson (2007) describing the task of 
measuring ‘innovative intensity’ in a way that is comparable across countries and industries 
as being almost insurmountable.   
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  Another limitation in using GEM to draw conclusions regarding innovative entry is 
that, in its current incarnation, GEM only captures product innovation but not process 
innovation. As early as Schumpeter (1924) a distinction was made between process and 
product innovation (although the two can take place simultaneously) and other surveys in this 
field, notably the Community Innovation Survey, typically differentiate between the two 
types of innovation. On the other hand, however, it is likely that the omission of an explicit 
process-related question would be more of an issue for established firms. 
  
 As mentioned, our dataset also includes a series of country level variables imported 
from various sources. These include GDP per capita, GDP growth, a proxy to capture the 
strength of intellectual property rights and an indicator on financial freedom, which proxies 
for the range of options in the supply of formal finance, available to entrepreneurs. 
  
Finally, we also constructed a cross-country dataset of venture capital (VC). Data on 
VC is still not readily available from government statistical offices and a variety of sources 
were consulted. Generally, each country will have a national venture capital association 
which holds annual data on VC. These values were then converted in US dollars for 
comparability. In studying cross-country VC patterns, one clearly notices a difference in the 
quality (and quantity) of data across different nations. In hunting for VC data, scholars 
attempting a similar exercise will encounter three possible scenarios: (i) the USA and most 
EU countries, for which good data is generally available and it is possible to differentiate 
between different typologies of VC (like early-stage and technologically-intensive), (ii) other 
high income countries like Australia and New Zealand, with some aggregate data being 
available and finally, (iii) the vast majority of countries, and virtually all developing ones, for 
which no data is available. In all, we have VC data for 21 middle and high income countries3.                         
 Table 1 lists variables used including a brief description, the sources of data and 
descriptive statistics. 
 
 
3.1 The model   
 
The dataset described in the previous section, allows us to study individuals’ 
decisions to enter with high employment growth aspirations. We present the occupational 
dilemma faced by individuals as two alternative models. The first can be expressed as the 
following decisional choice model: 
 
Pr(Gazelle)  = 1 if involved in a start-up with expected employment creation ≥ 30 
   = 0 otherwise 
 (1) 
We estimate this empirically with the following probit model (Model 1): 
 
)()1Pr( xbxGazelle Φ==  
 
Where, again, Gazelle=1 if entrepreneurial entry occurs with the expectation of 
having at least 30 employees within five years, and x is a vector of the regressors described in 
                                                 
3  USA, Greece, Netherlands, Belgium, France, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, UK, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Poland, Germany, New Zealand, Japan, Canada, Portugal, Finland, and Israel.  
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Table 1c below. Different specifications are reported to investigate the effect of the age and 
gender variable: Model 1 includes a squared term for the age variable (age_sq); Model 2 
replaces this with an interactive term of age and gender (male_x_age) and Model 3 includes 
both.  
Corresponding to the hypotheses discussed above, we also try specifications (Model 
1(a); Model 2(a) and Model 3(a)) where our innovation variable (Innovation) is interacted 
with our intellectual property protection proxy (IPP) and with venture capital supply (VC). 
Innovation can take the following values Innovation=1 if there is entry, Innovation=2 if the 
entry contains some innovation, Innovation=3 if the new enterprise is entirely innovative. 
To check the sensitivity of our results to the construction of dependent variable and 
in order to analyse how our variables affect HGE further, we construct an alternative 
dependent variable, HGE, which expands entrepreneurs’ expectations into 10 values ranging 
from 0 (if the respondent does not envisage to employ any additional members of staff within 
the next five year) to 9 (if she thinks 30 or more people will be employed). Table 1b shows 
summary values for the various bins for HGE.  
We denote the 10 values of HGE as J, mGEi =H  if mim GE Γ<≤Γ − *1 H for 1=m to J, 
where Γ indicates the cut-off points. This can be estimated using the following ordered probit 
model:  
 
)()()Pr( 1 ββ xFxFxmHGE mm −Γ−−Γ== −  
 (2) 
We then apply the same specifications describe above for the probit model, in Model 
4 to Model 6 (without interactions) and model 4a to model 6a (interacting the innovation 
variable with IPP and VC).  
 Throughout, when estimating the above models, we generate clustered (robust) 
standard errors around country-year clusters to account for possible survey biases. Given the 
sample size, without this correction, the significance levels of country level variables would 
be hugely inflated. 
Discussion of results follows. 
 
4. Results   
 
Results from Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3 reported in Table 4 below, suggest that 
pursuing innovative projects (Innovation_2 and Innovation_3) has an effect on whether the 
enterprise is a gazelle or not confirming H1 at 1%. The role of VC seems more ambiguous, 
since although the sign is as expected, it does not have a statistically significant effect. 
However, when the innovation variable is interacted with IPP and VC in Models 1(a) to 
Model 3(a) (reported in Table  5), the interaction of VC and innovation – ipp_innov - 
becomes significantly associated with the Gazelle effect (significant at 5%). So H2 holds in 
the interacted form: availability of venture capital has strong effect on innovative 
entrepreneurs resulting in adoption of higher growth aspirations. This is the “do it now” 
effect predicted by Schwienbacher (2007): with VC supply being available, innovative 
entrepreneurs entering the market have the incentive to use own resources to achieve some 
intermediate stage of expansion faster so that attracting attention of outside investors 
becomes possible. 
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 We also confirm H3 (intellectual property rights) at 1%. However H3a is not 
confirmed: protection of intellectual property does not have any specific differential impact 
of the likelihood of innovative entrepreneurs to implement high growth strategies (but 
compare with the results discussed below for the whole range of variation in growth 
expectations). 
 In contrast with VC, the two other financial indicators we control for (prevalence rate 
of informal finance and financial freedom) have no significant impact on HGE entry. The 
lagged rate of economic growth (delta_gdp_lag1) has significant but negative effect. The 
level of GDP per capital has a negative effect, consistent with catching-up interpretation 
outlined above: more opportunities for high growth projects seem to exist in middle income 
countries compared with high income countries.  
 Individual level variables generally have the expected signs when statistically 
significant. As expected human capital play a role in explaining HGE in terms of education 
(educ_secpost) but this does not seem to hold for experience as represented by a dummy 
variable for entrepreneurs who have already established a business in the past. We find that 
whether the entrepreneur has completed at least secondary education is a strong predictor of 
HGE entry (significant and positive at 1%). The models produce expected results regarding 
the age and gender effect. We find that males are more likely to be involved in HGE than 
women, and interacting the gender variable with age does not change this result. Effect of age 
is non-linear: including a squared term for age produces a hump-shaped relationship between 
HGE entry and age.   
 Last but not least, the attitude towards risk counts: fear of failure is a significant factor 
working against HGE entry. 
 
Results from Model 4 to Model 6, which use more variation in growth aspirations 
found in Table 6, are largely in line with the results described for Models 1-3, with an 
important exception: interactive term between innovative entry and intellectual property 
protection now becomes significant and this effect dominates over the interactive effect 
between the venture capital supply and innovativeness of entrepreneurs. This difference is not 
difficult to explain: the first set of equations (Models 1-3) focus just on gazelles, and this is 
where supply of venture capital is particularly beneficial. Thus, for innovative project, 
availability of VC does not have a significant effect raising expectations along all the 
variation of our HGE variable, yet it is associated with emergence of a specific group of 
highest growth aspirations projects (gazelles). 
In addition results presented in Table 6 confirm that the other explanatory variables 
are strong predictors of whether a start-up has high growth expectations. However there are 
also some interesting differences. In particular, once we use more heterogeneity in growth 
aspirations, VC supply matters by itself (in additive form); and experience as represented by 
both business ownership and work experience becomes more important than educational 
attainment. In addition, now, the interactive term between gender and age is significant in 
contrast with the non-linear age specification: while there is a general negative effect of age 
on HGE entry, this negative impact is smaller for man and taking this into account explains 
the observed pattern in HGE better than non-linearity in age. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
We find that both supply of venture capital and protection of intellectual property are 
important factors supporting high growth aspirations of new innovative entrepreneurs. While, 
overall, high growth potential projects benefit from the presence of venture capital, it is the 
innovative ventures that benefit most. Availability of venture capital does not affect growth 
aspirations of innovative entrepreneurs across the whole spectrum of planned growth, but 
makes highest growth innovative projects (gazelles) significantly more likely. In addition, 
intellectual property protection has also more beneficial effects lifting growth aspirations of 
innovative entrepreneurs across the whole spectrum. 
In contrast, both informal finance and institutional framework related to formal finance (other 
than venture capital) matter less: sings of the coefficients are positive as expected, but the 
effects remain insignificant.  
High growth aspirations are subjective perceptions of entrepreneurs yet they are important. 
They motivate start-up owners-managers to engage in high value added activities. Supply of 
such high aspiration entrepreneurship is crucial for economic development. Even if many of 
those ventures may fail, it is sufficient that some will succeed to generate strong 
microeconomic foundation for growth and development. This is why incidence of 
entrepreneurs with high aspirations matters. The key policy lesson from this paper is that if 
we care most about transforming new innovative projects into highest value “gazelle” 
entrepreneurial ventures, we should focus on the development of the form of finance that is 
most suitable to overcome serious informational asymmetries associated with those that is on 
venture capital.  
On individual level, both the propensity to innovate and attitudes towards risk seem to be the 
key factors behind the supply of the high-potential projects. Public policy that shapes both the 
educational system and national culture to become more supportive and more rewarding 
towards innovative activities, risk-taking and entrepreneurial effort can make impact. 
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 Table 1a: Descriptive statistics and definitions of dependent variables 
 
 
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean
Std. 
Dev. Min Max
 
        
Gazelle  
1 if HGE=>9 
(minimum of 
30 employees) GEM 16135 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00
 
 
HGE  GEM 16135 2.58 3.05 0.00 9.00
 
 
 
Table 1b: Construction of HGE based on employement creation expectations in 5 years 
 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
0 11996 0 0 0 0
1 1918 1 0 1 1
2 2520 2 0 2 2
3 1882 3 0 3 3
4 1412 4 0 4 4
5 1754 5 0 5 5
6 1445 6.83 0.96 6.00 9.00
7 2319 11.39 2.07 10.00 15.00
8 1000 20.95 2.27 16.00 29.00
9 1476 1996.16 23122.40 30.00 500000.00
 27722 109.32 5352.39 0.00 500000.00
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Table 1c: Descriptive statistics and definitions of independent variables 
Variable Definition Source Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Innovation 1=entry, 2=low 
innovative 
entry, 3=high 
innovative 
entry 
GEM 13966 1.40 0.66 1.00 3.00 
gemage The exact age 
of the 
respondent at 
time of 
interview 
GEM 331542 44.27 17.04 1.00 104.00 
male_x_age interaction of 
gemage and 
male 
GEM 331542 20.49 24.70 0.00 104.00 
age_sq gemage 
squared 
GEM 331542 2250.46 1627.11 1.00 10816.00
educ_secpost 1=respondent 
has a post 
secondary or 
higher 
education 
attainment, 0 
otherwise 
GEM 326497 0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 
educ_postgra 1=respondent 
has a post 
secondary or 
higher 
education 
attainment, 0 
otherwise 
GEM 326497 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
educ_grad 1= has 
graduate 
experience, 0 
otherwise 
GEM 326497 0.08 0.28 0.00 1.00 
male 1=male, zero 
otherwise 
GEM 347964 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 
gemwork_dum 1=respondent 
is either in full 
or part time 
employment, 0  
if not 
GEM 339169 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00 
own_estab_bus 1=current 
owner/manager 
of business, 0 
otherwise 
GEM 347964 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00 
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fear 1=respondent 
has shut down 
business in 
past 12 month, 
0 otherwise 
GEM 276039 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
financial_freedom financial 
freedom 
indicator 
Heritage 
Foundation 
347964 72.91 16.86 30.00 90.00 
busang_prevalen 1=business 
angel in past 
three years, 0 
otherwise 
GEM 347964 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07 
VC venture capital 
(in constant US 
$) divided by 
GDP *1000 
European 
VC 
Association 
and  national 
venture 
capital 
associations 
347964 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
IPP Intellectual 
property 
protection 
World 
Economic 
Forum 
347964 5.63 0.69 3.40 6.60 
ipp_innov interaction of 
IPP and 
innovation 
 27096 0.29 1.25 0.00 6.30 
vc_innov interaction of 
VC and 
innovation 
 27096 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
delta_gdp_lag1 GDP growth 
rate in previous 
year 
World Bank - 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
347964 2.28 1.46 -2.05 8.71 
ln_gdp_pc_pp natual logarith 
of gdp per 
capita at PPP 
World Bank - 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
347964 10.29 0.21 9.37 10.75 
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Table 4: Probit Models (dependent variable Gazelle)  
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
VARIABLES  
Marginal 
effects  
Marginal 
effects  
Marginal 
effects 
       
Innovation_2 0.131*** 0.0209*** 0.133*** 0.0213*** 0.132*** 0.0210*** 
 (0.0415) (0.00706) (0.0412) (0.00703) (0.0412) (0.00702) 
Innovation_3 0.356*** 0.0650*** 0.358*** 0.0655*** 0.356*** 0.0650*** 
 (0.0431) (0.00997) (0.0428) (0.00996) (0.0429) (0.00996) 
gemage -0.00921** -0.00141** -0.00277 -0.000425 -0.0104* -0.00158* 
 (0.00449) (0.000650) (0.00282) (0.000429) (0.00571) (0.000843)
age_sq 9.60e-05* 1.47e-05*   9.5e-05* 1.46e-05* 
 (5.39e-05) (7.93e-06)   (5.4e-05) (7.92e-06) 
educ_secpost 0.138*** 0.0199*** 0.137*** 0.0198*** 0.137*** 0.0198*** 
 (0.0530) (0.00732) (0.0527) (0.00730) (0.0527) (0.00729) 
educ_postgra 0.0763 0.0117 0.0741 0.0114 0.0755 0.0116 
 (0.0517) (0.00787) (0.0520) (0.00791) (0.0518) (0.00788) 
educ_grad 0.0609 0.00961 0.0615 0.00971 0.0601 0.00948 
 (0.0569) (0.00907) (0.0576) (0.00918) (0.0568) (0.00905) 
male 0.296*** 0.0421*** 0.229* 0.0331* 0.234* 0.0339* 
 (0.0451) (0.00582) (0.132) (0.0179) (0.130) (0.0176) 
gemwork_dum 0.0701 0.0105 0.0604 0.00906 0.0702 0.0105 
 (0.0572) (0.00856) (0.0564) (0.00850) (0.0573) (0.00857) 
own_estab_bus 0.0980 0.0158 0.0958 0.0155 0.0975 0.0157 
 (0.0661) (0.0112) (0.0663) (0.0112) (0.0664) (0.0112) 
fear -0.0891* -0.0131* -0.0894* -0.0132* -0.0894* -0.0131* 
 (0.0506) (0.00717) (0.0504) (0.00714) (0.0503) (0.00714) 
financial_freedom -0.00101 -0.000155 -0.00106 -0.000162 -0.001 -0.000153 
 (0.00187) (0.000287) (0.00188) (0.000288) (0.00188) (0.000289)
busang_prevalen 0.741 0.113 0.819 0.125 0.774 0.118 
 (2.993) (0.455) (3.010) (0.458) (2.986) (0.454) 
VC 8991 1375 9056 1386 9010 1378 
 (7155) (1068) (7117) (1062) (7161) (1069) 
IPP 0.314*** 0.0480*** 0.313*** 0.0479*** 0.315*** 0.0481*** 
 (0.110) (0.0151) (0.110) (0.0151) (0.110) (0.0151) 
delta_gdp_lag1 -0.0449* -0.00687* -0.0448* -0.00686* -0.0448* -0.00685* 
 (0.0258) (0.00388) (0.0258) (0.00389) (0.0258) (0.00388) 
ln_gdp_pc_pp -0.518** -0.0793** -0.508** -0.0778** -0.519** -0.0794** 
 (0.243) (0.0353) (0.241) (0.0351) (0.243) (0.0354) 
male_x_age   0.00182 0.000278 0.00160 0.000245 
   (0.00342) (0.000524) (0.00336) (0.000515)
Constant 2.042  1.860  2.091  
 (2.084)  (2.054)  (2.086)  
Observations 8370 8370 8370 8370 8370 8370 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1      
Robust standard errors (clustered on country-years) in parentheses   
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Table 5: Probit Models; interactions with innovation (dependent: Gazelle) 
 Model 1(a) Model 2(a) Model 3(a) 
VARIABLES  
Marginal 
effects  
Marginal 
effects  
Marginal 
effects 
Innovation_2 0.130*** 0.0208*** 0.132*** 0.0212*** 0.131*** 0.0209*** 
 (0.0413) (0.00701) (0.0410) (0.00699) (0.0410) (0.00698) 
Innovation_3 0.392 0.0727 0.395 0.0735 0.392 0.0727 
 (0.597) (0.133) (0.594) (0.132) (0.596) (0.132) 
gemage -0.0093** -0.00143** -0.00276 -0.000423 -0.0104* -0.00160* 
 (0.00448) (0.000648) (0.00282) (0.000429) (0.00571) (0.000842)
age_sq 9.72e-05* 1.49e-05*   9.6e-05* 1.5e-05* 
 (5.4e-05) (7.91e-06)   (5.4e-05) (7.90e-06) 
educ_secpost 0.138*** 0.0199*** 0.137*** 0.0198*** 0.138*** 0.0199*** 
 (0.0529) (0.00731) (0.0526) (0.00728) (0.0526) (0.00728) 
educ_postgra 0.0749 0.0115 0.0727 0.0111 0.0741 0.0113 
 (0.0516) (0.00784) (0.0518) (0.00789) (0.0517) (0.00785) 
educ_grad 0.0622 0.00982 0.0629 0.00993 0.0615 0.00969 
 (0.0566) (0.00903) (0.0573) (0.00914) (0.0565) (0.00901) 
Male 0.298*** 0.0424*** 0.232* 0.0336* 0.238* 0.0343* 
 (0.0453) (0.00586) (0.132) (0.0179) (0.130) (0.0176) 
gemwork_dum 0.0709 0.0106 0.0611 0.00916 0.0710 0.0106 
 (0.0571) (0.00853) (0.0563) (0.00848) (0.0572) (0.00855) 
own_estab_bus 0.0983 0.0159 0.0961 0.0155 0.0978 0.0158 
 (0.0661) (0.0112) (0.0663) (0.0112) (0.0664) (0.0112) 
fear -0.0865* -0.0127* -0.0868* -0.0128* -0.0868* -0.0128* 
 (0.0508) (0.00722) (0.0506) (0.00719) (0.0506) (0.00718) 
financial_freedom -0.00100 -0.000153 -0.00105 -0.000160 -0.001 -0.000151 
 (0.00186) (0.000285) (0.00187) (0.000286) (0.00188) (0.000287)
busang_prevalen 0.883 0.135 0.958 0.146 0.914 0.140 
 (2.946) (0.447) (2.964) (0.450) (2.940) (0.446) 
VC 6506 994.6 6601 1010 6528 997.8 
 (5814) (865.5) (5799) (863.2) (5825) (866.9) 
IPP 0.319*** 0.0488*** 0.318*** 0.0487*** 0.320*** 0.0489*** 
 (0.106) (0.0146) (0.107) (0.0147) (0.106) (0.0146) 
ipp_innov -0.0154 -0.00236 -0.0155 -0.00238 -0.0154 -0.00235 
 (0.0998) (0.0153) (0.0992) (0.0152) (0.0996) (0.0153) 
vc_innov 34866** 5330** 34590** 5291** 34826** 5323** 
 (14173) (2140) (14108) (2131) (14160) (2137) 
delta_gdp_lag1 -0.0428* -0.00655* -0.0428* -0.00655* -0.0427* -0.00653* 
 (0.0255) (0.00384) (0.0255) (0.00384) (0.0255) (0.00383) 
ln_gdp_pc_pp -0.527** -0.0805** -0.516** -0.0790** -0.528** -0.0806** 
 (0.241) (0.0350) (0.239) (0.0348) (0.241) (0.0350) 
male_x_age   0.00178 0.000272 0.00157 0.000239 
   (0.00343) (0.000525) (0.00337) (0.000515)
Constant 2.096  1.909  2.144  
 (2.078)  (2.047)  (2.080)  
Observations 8370 8370 8370 8370 8370 8370 
Robust SE (clustered on country years) in 
parentheses; ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
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Table 6: Ordered Probit Models (dependent variable: HGE) 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a 
VARIABLES marginal effects 
       
Innovation_2 0.0771* 0.0800* 0.0784* 0.0774* 0.0803* 0.0787* 
 (0.0442) (0.0441) (0.0442) (0.0440) (0.0439) (0.0440) 
Innovation_3 0.221*** 0.223*** 0.221*** -0.354 -0.352 -0.348 
 (0.0352) (0.0351) (0.0351) (0.233) (0.233) (0.233) 
gemage -0.0106* 
-
0.00634*** -0.0136** -0.0106* 
-
0.00635*** -0.0136** 
 (0.00601) (0.00158) (0.00663) (0.00603) (0.00158) (0.00665) 
age_sq 9.03e-05  9.00e-05 8.94e-05  8.91e-05 
 
(6.40e-
05)  
(6.66e-
05) 
(6.43e-
05)  
(6.68e-
05) 
educ_secpost 0.0599 0.0591 0.0593 0.0586 0.0579 0.0581 
 (0.0401) (0.0398) (0.0400) (0.0400) (0.0398) (0.0400) 
educ_postgra 0.0300 0.0266 0.0280 0.0298 0.0264 0.0278 
 (0.0362) (0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0358) (0.0356) 
educ_grad 0.0131 0.0122 0.0107 0.0136 0.0128 0.0112 
 (0.0402) (0.0400) (0.0403) (0.0401) (0.0399) (0.0402) 
male 0.337*** 0.172*** 0.170** 0.337*** 0.173*** 0.172** 
 (0.0246) (0.0659) (0.0691) (0.0247) (0.0659) (0.0691) 
gemwork_dum 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.144*** 0.144*** 0.136*** 0.144*** 
 (0.0259) (0.0248) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0250) (0.0262) 
own_estab_bus 0.125*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.126*** 0.124*** 0.125*** 
 (0.0462) (0.0464) (0.0462) (0.0458) (0.0460) (0.0458) 
fear -0.0671** -0.0671** -0.0669** -0.0654** -0.0655** -0.0652** 
 (0.0310) (0.0310) (0.0308) (0.0309) (0.0308) (0.0307) 
financial_freedom 
-
0.00376* -0.00374* -0.00371* 
-
0.00383* -0.00381* -0.00378* 
 (0.00203) (0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00202) (0.00201) 
busang_prevalen 1.112 1.248 1.194 1.168 1.302 1.248 
 (1.719) (1.738) (1.722) (1.706) (1.726) (1.709) 
VC 7562** 7707** 7603** 6722** 6864** 6766** 
 (3421) (3426) (3421) (2752) (2767) (2751) 
IPP 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 
 (0.0461) (0.0460) (0.0459) (0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0468) 
delta_gdp_lag1 -0.0288 -0.0289 -0.0287 -0.0273 -0.0274 -0.0272 
 (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0186) 
ln_gdp_pc_pp -0.399*** -0.394*** -0.401*** -0.395*** -0.390*** -0.397*** 
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.131) (0.131) (0.130) (0.131) 
male_x_age  0.00437** 0.00435**  0.00433** 0.00431**
  (0.00174) (0.00183)  (0.00174) (0.00183) 
ipp_innov    0.0970** 0.0968** 0.0960** 
    (0.0399) (0.0398) (0.0399) 
vc_innov    19459 19564 19447 
    (23424) (23201) (23364) 
Constant       
       
Observations 8370 8370 8370 8370 8370 8370 
 
Robust standard errors (clustered on country-years) in parentheses; ***p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
